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ABSTRACT
Shareholder proposals are a common form of shareholder activism. Voting for share-
holder proposals, however, is nonbinding since management has the authority to reject
the proposal even if it received majority support from shareholders. We analyze whether
nonbinding voting is an e¤ective mechanism for conveying shareholder expectations. We
show that, unlike binding voting, nonbinding voting generally fails to convey shareholder
views when manager and shareholder interests are not aligned. Surprisingly, the presence
of an activist investor who can discipline the manager may enhance the advisory role of
nonbinding voting only if conicts of interest between shareholders and the activist are
substantial.
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According to the SEC Rule 14a-8, shareholders of a public company are permitted to submit
a proposal to be voted on at the annual shareholder meeting. Unlike voting for management-
initiated proposals, the resolutions of votes on shareholder-initiated proposals are nonbinding
in the following sense: the companys board can make its own determination as to whether
adoption of all or any part of a shareholder proposal is in the companys best interests, even if
the proposal received substantial majority support from shareholders.1 ;2
Nonbinding shareholder proposals have become increasingly common in recent years, espe-
cially in the post-Enron era. While the number of governance-related proposals in the U.S. was
about 270 per year over the period 1997 to 2002, it spiked to more than 400 per year over 2003
to 2006 (see Ertimur, Ferri and Stubben (2010) and Buchanan, Netter and Yang (2010)).3
Voting support for shareholder proposals has also steadily increased in the recent years.
There are increasing numbers of shareowner proposals, more forvotes of support for them,
and withholdvotes for directors who are unresponsive to shareowners. This trend will continue
as we seek better alignment with boards to implement corporate governance practices that will
pay o¤ in higher investment returns, said Russell Read, CalPERS Chief Investment O¢ cer
(August 13, 2007, CalPERS website). Indeed, Ertimur, Ferri and Stubben (2010) document
that the fraction of governance-related proposals receiving a majority vote was only 10.5% in
1997 but more than 29% in 2004. Similarly, Buchanan, Netter, and Yang (2010) nd that the
number of majority-vote proposals has increased from 12.9% in 2000 to 21.2% in 2006.4
The majority of shareholder proposals, about two thirds according to Buchanan, Netter
1More specically, Rule 14a-8 allows companies to exclude most binding proposals as "not a proper subject
for action by shareholders" under the corporate law of the companys state of incorporation. On the other
hand, proposals that are cast as recommendations are usually considered to be proper under state law. For
these reasons, the vast majority of shareholder proposals in the U.S. are precatory and therefore, nonbinding:
according to the 2007 Institutional Shareholder Services report (ISS (2007)), nonbinding proposals accounted
for 98% of the total shareholder resolutions in the U.S. in 2007.
2Shareholder proposals are not universally nonbinding. In the UK and most of Continental Europe, voting
for shareholder proposals is binding (see, e.g., Cziraki, Renneboog, and Szilagyi (2010)).
3For comparison, the number of management-initiated proposals in the U.S. was about 1,450 per year over
the period 1994 to 2003 (see, e.g., Maug and Rydqvist (2009)). This large number can be explained by several
reasons. First, management-initiated proposals relate to a broader set of issues, including restructuring and
nancing decisions. Second, the companys management is usually obligated by law to bring an agenda, such
as a merger agreement, to a shareholder vote.
4Maug and Rydqvist (2009) nd that 98% of management-initiated proposals in their sample were approved
by shareholders. This might not be very surprising, because voting on management proposals is binding, and
therefore managers are likely to put proposals to a vote only if they are su¢ ciently condent that shareholders
will approve them.
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and Yang (2010), are related to rms corporate governance practices such as anti-takeover
defenses, executive compensation, board independence and elections, and shareholder rights.
In most cases, the agenda is to tighten the corporate governance of the rm or to express general
dissatisfaction with the companys management. For this reason, and due to potential conict of
interest, boards and managers may ignore the resolutions of shareholder proposals. According
to Ertimur, Ferri and Stubben (2010), only 30% of the proposals that received majority support
were implemented within one year from the vote.
If resolutions of shareholder proposals can be ignored by boards and managers, to what
extent is this form of shareholder activism e¤ective? This question is especially relevant in
light of the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires a nonbinding vote on executive compensation at
publicly traded companies that should be held at least every three years. The goal of this paper
is to examine a potential mechanism that may lead management to respond to or to ignore
shareholder concerns as reected in the nonbinding vote.
We develop a model of nonbinding voting that focuses on the information revealed during
the voting process and the managers reaction to this information. The model considers voting
for a proposal whose value to shareholders is uncertain and may increase or decrease the value
of the rm. Information about the value of the proposal is dispersed among shareholders:
shareholders receive private signals about the proposal and then decide how to vote. The
manager of the rm is uninformed about the value of the proposal.5 Once shareholders have
voted, the manager observes the vote tally, updates his beliefs about shareholdersexpectations,
and only then decides whether to approve the proposal. Because the vote is nonbinding, the
manager is permitted to reject the proposal even if a majority of shareholders voted for it. We
assume that the manager cares about shareholder value and hence, accepts the proposal if he
believes that it is su¢ ciently valuable for the rm. However, the manager may also have private
benets of control and thus be more inclined than shareholders to reject the proposal.
Our rst result shows that when the preferences of shareholders and the manager are not
closely aligned, nonbinding voting fails to convey shareholdersexpectations. Essentially, share-
holders optimally decide to ignore their private information and vote for the proposal regardless
of their signals. Thus, nonbinding voting for shareholder proposals generally has little advisory
5Whether or not the manager is privately informed does not change our results in any signicant way. See
the discussion at the end of Section I for more details.
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role for the management.
The intuition is as follows. Shareholders vote strategically, taking into account that their
vote only matters in situations where it changes the managers decision to accept the proposal.
A rational shareholder therefore conditions his decision not only on his private signal, but also
on the information that is true in the situation when his vote is pivotal for the managers
decision. Because the manager is more inclined than shareholders to reject a shareholder
proposal, he accepts the proposal only if there is strong evidence that it is value increasing, i.e.,
if the proposal receives su¢ ciently strong support from shareholders. It follows that when a
shareholders vote is pivotal for the managers decision, it must be the case that a vast majority
of other shareholders support the proposal. Therefore, the information embedded in the event
of being pivotal overwhelms the shareholders own private information and gives him incentives
to vote for the proposal independent of his own signal. As a result, the vote tally does not
reect shareholdersexpectations.
In our basic setting the manager can ignore majority-supported resolutions without bearing
any real consequences. In practice, however, the market for corporate control can impose
discipline on managers and directors if it becomes evident that they have failed to act in the
best interests of shareholders. An important mechanism of such managerial discipline are proxy
ghts initiated by activist investors. For example, Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) nd that
the frequency of a proxy contest attempt is signicantly higher following majority-supported
shareholder proposals. A notable case illustrating this mechanism is the 2007 proxy ght at
CSX organized by the activist hedge fund TCI.6
To incorporate managerial discipline, we extend the basic model and introduce an activist
investor who observes the vote outcome and the managers decision. If the activist believes
that the manager takes a value reducing action, she can incur some costs and organize a proxy
ght in order to replace the manager, thereby reversing his decision. We allow for a conict
6The proxy contest followed a nonbinding proposal to allow large shareholders to call special meetings, which
was approved by about 70% of votes at CSXs 2007 annual meeting. Pressured by strong shareholder support,
the company adopted a bylaw on special meetings which, however, was signicantly limited and, among other
things, excluded director elections from shareholder-called special meetings. Dissatised with the managements
response to the proposal and overall reluctance to engage in a productive dialogue, TCI nominated a dissident
slate of directors to stand for election at the 2008 CSX shareholder meeting. In addition, it urged shareholders to
repeal the bylaw amendment made by the CSX board and instead, approve TCIs own special meeting proposal.
See, for example, RiskMetrics Group - Risk & Governance Blog, "CSX Proxy Fight Preview", June 13, 2008.
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of interest between the activist and shareholders and in particular, assume that the activist
may have private benets from opposing the manager and accepting the shareholder proposal.
Thus, while the manager is biased against the approval of the proposal, the activist is biased
against its rejection.7
Our main result shows that the presence of an activist investor can improve information
aggregation in nonbinding voting. Surprisingly, however, information aggregation is improved
only if the activist is su¢ ciently biased towards approving the proposal, i.e., if there is signicant
conict of interest between the activist and shareholders. If, on the other hand, the activists
interests are closely aligned with those of shareholders, nonbinding voting still fails to convey
shareholder expectations.
Intuitively, the activist whose interests are closely aligned with those of shareholders does
not engage in a costly proxy ght unless there is su¢ ciently strong evidence that the man-
ager has rejected a benecial proposal. This gives the manager discretion to reject some value
increasing proposals, inducing shareholders to disregard their private information and vote af-
rmatively by a similar reasoning as before. On the other hand, if the activists private benets
from accepting the proposal are substantial, she organizes a proxy ght even if there is only
weak evidence that the manager rejected a value increasing proposal, thereby inducing the
manager to accept the proposal more often. Essentially, the activists over tendency to accept
the proposal counterbalances the managers over tendency to reject the proposal, resulting in a
balanced decision rule that gives shareholders incentives to vote according to their information.
Interestingly, our analysis emphasizes that shareholders may benet from having an oppor-
tunistic activist investor, even though such activist is biased and sometimes takes actions that
are ex-post value reducing.
Finally, we show that when nonbinding voting has advisory role for the management (e.g., in
the presence of an opportunistic activist), shareholders may prefer the nonbinding mechanism
over binding voting - a voting mechanism where an exogenous voting rule determines the
outcome based on the vote tally. As our analysis of nonbinding voting demonstrates, there
exists an endogenous threshold such that in equilibrium the manager accepts the proposal if
7Anabtawi and Stout (2008) provide a comprehensive discussion of common conicts of interest between
activist investors and minority shareholders. Examples include short-termist goals of certain types of activists,
self dealing involving other companies in activistsportfolios, and the expansion of labor rights desired by union
fund managers. See Section II for more examples.
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and only if the number of a¢ rmative votes exceeds this threshold. In other words, nonbinding
voting is e¤ectively binding with an endogenously determined voting threshold that depends on
the company and proposal characteristics. This exibility to tailor the voting threshold to the
rm does not exist in binding voting, suggesting potential ine¢ ciencies. Our analysis conrms
this intuition and shows that a binding mechanism restricted to a pure majority rule is often
inferior to a nonbinding mechanism.
We contribute to the literature on corporate governance and shareholder voting in several
ways. Our paper is the rst to present a formal model of nonbinding voting and suggest
a mechanism that could lead management to implement shareholder proposals. The model
provides new predictions about the determinants of managerial responsiveness to nonbinding
proposals and the likelihood of a proxy ght. Second, we show that some corporate governance
imperfections, such as the presence of an opportunistic activist, may actually be benecial for
shareholders ex-ante, by allowing more informative decision making. We also demonstrate that
the nonbinding voting mechanism is very di¤erent from the binding mechanism in its ability
to aggregate shareholdersinformation, and that the former can often be superior. Last, we
emphasize the signaling role of shareholder voting, not only to the rms management, but also
to activist investors and potential raiders.
Our paper is not the rst to examine information aggregation in voting in the presence of
conicts of interest. Maug and Yilmaz (2002) and Maug (1999) focus on the conict of interest
between di¤erent voters in the binding voting mechanism. Their reasoning of why the conict
of interest between voters may lead to worse information aggregation is close to our result that
nonbinding voting fails to convey shareholdersinformation when the manager is in conict of
interest with the shareholders. While these papers propose, respectively, the two-class binding
voting mechanism and trading in the stock market prior to the vote as possible solutions to
improve information aggregation, we emphasize the role of the market for corporate control.
Bond and Eraslan (2010) examine e¢ ciency of di¤erent binding voting rules when the proposal
that is put to a vote is endogenous, and the proposer and voters have di¤erent preferences.
They show that the unanimity rule may be preferred to any other voting rule by both the
proposer and the voters. By contrast, our paper compares e¢ ciency of nonbinding and binding
voting when the proposal on the agenda is exogenous. Coughlan (2000) considers a two-stage
game where voters with heterogeneous preferences rst communicate with each other and then
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participate in a binding vote. He demonstrates that truthful communication among voters is
possible only if their preferences are su¢ ciently close to each other. This result is related to our
result that communication between shareholders and the manager through the nonbinding vote
is possible only if the managers preferences are su¢ ciently aligned with those of shareholders.
In the context of two candidate binding elections, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997, 1998)
show that whenever the voting rule is di¤erent from the unanimity rule, information is e¢ -
ciently aggregated in large elections, in the sense that the chosen candidate would not change
if all private information was common knowledge. In other words, binding voting e¢ ciently
aggregates private information when the population of voters is large. In contrast, the analysis
of our paper demonstrates that nonbinding voting may fail to aggregate shareholdersprivate
information when the managers interests are not closely aligned to those of shareholders, even
with a large number of voters.
Our paper is also closely related to the cheap talk literature when there is a conict of
interest between the sender and the receiver (see, e.g., Crawford and Sobel (1982)). Nonbind-
ing voting is a form of cheap talk since shareholdersvotes do not a¤ect their payo¤s directly,
but only through their e¤ect on the managers decision. Morgan and Stocken (2008) study
information aggregation in polls when the constituentsideology is heterogeneous. Polls and
nonbinding voting are similar in that by expressing their views, poll constituents do not change
the outcome directly and only a¤ect it indirectly by conveying their information to the decision
maker. The authors show that information can be perfectly aggregated only if the poll size is
su¢ ciently small. In the context of corporate governance, our analysis shows how imperfec-
tions of the market for corporate control can enhance the advisory role of nonbinding voting.
Our paper is also related to Krishna and Morgan (2001), who study communication between
multiple informed but biased experts and a single decision maker. They show that revelation of
information can be improved by consulting more than one expert only if experts are biased in
opposite directions. In contrast, we nd that aggregation of information is improved when the
conict of interest is between the decision makers rather than between the experts. That is,
nonbinding voting has an advisory role only when the activist investor and manager compete
for control.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on formal vs. real authority in organizations
(e.g., Aghion and Tirole (1997)). In our model of nonbinding voting the rms management
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has formal authority: it can reject or accept the proposal independently of the vote outcome.
The focus of our paper is studying the circumstances under which shareholders, who have in-
formation, retain real authority. We demonstrate that the companys management is likely to
give up its formal authority and follow shareholdersvoice when it is subject to discipline
by activists. We also show that providing shareholders with formal authority, i.e., introduc-
ing binding voting on shareholder proposals, can be inferior to nonbinding voting whenever
shareholders retain real authority. Overall, our analysis contributes to the literature on author-
ity in organizations by focusing on the strategic aspects of communication in the context of
nonbinding voting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the basic model
of nonbinding voting. Section II extends the model by introducing the market for corporate
control. Section III analyzes comparative statics of the model. Section IV compares the relative
e¢ ciency of binding and nonbinding voting mechanisms. Section V o¤ers some concluding
remarks. All proofs, supplemental results, and the summary of notations used in the paper are
collected in the Appendix and the Internet Appendix.8
I Basic Model
A Setup
Consider a rm that is owned byN > 1 shareholders and run by a manager. Each shareholder
holds the same stake in the rm (for simplicity, one share). We restrict attention to the "one-
share-one-vote" rule, where each share provides exactly one vote. There are two stages in the
model: rst, shareholders participate in a nonbinding vote for a proposal, and then the manager
decides whether to accept or reject the proposal. The model does not distinguish between the
board and the manager of the rm. Let d represent whether the proposal is accepted (d = A)
or rejected (d = R).
The value of the proposal to the rm is uncertain. We denote this value by v(d; ), where
 2 fG;Bg is the state of the world. When  = G; we say that the state is good, and otherwise,
the state is bad. In particular, rm value per share increases by 1 if the proposal is accepted in
8The Internet Appendix is available on The Journal of Finance website at
http://www.afajof.org/supplements.asp.
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the good state, v(A;G) = 1, and decreases by 1 if it is accepted in the bad state, v(A;B) =  1.9
If the proposal is rejected, the value of the rm does not change: v(R; ) = 0. For example,
consider a proposal to remove the companys takeover defense such as a poison pill. While
the presence of a poison pill may deter some value increasing takeovers, it can also protect
shareholders from coercive, value decreasing takeovers and inadequate bids. The value from
the proposal thus crucially depends on the synergies from the potential merger: the proposal
to remove the pill should be accepted if the merger is value increasing (the state is good) and
should be rejected if the merger is value decreasing (the state is bad).
The manager and shareholders share the same prior belief that the probability of the good
state is 0:5. Considering prior beliefs di¤erent from 0:5 would not qualitatively change our
results.
Shareholders might use nonbinding proposals to communicate their opinions and expec-
tations, thereby advising corporate decision makers about issues on the agenda. To focus
attention on the ow of information from shareholders to the rms management, we assume
that the manager is uninformed, but each shareholder observes a private signal si 2 fg; bg
(good or bad), whose precision is represented by  2 (0:5; 1) :
Pr(si = gj = G) = Pr(si = bj = B) = : (1)
All signals are independent conditional on the state of the world.10
Shareholders have su¢ cient incentives to become informed if they have signicant holdings
in the company. For example, large shareholders could be informed about the presence of a
value increasing raider and communicate this knowledge to the manager by voting to remove a
poison pill or declassify the board (more than 25% of governance-related proposals are related
to poison pill repeals or declassication of the board, as documented by Ertimur, Ferri, and
9The analysis could be extended to a proposal with arbitrary value in each state without qualitatively
changing any results.
10There is a broad literature on how corporate insiders may learn value-relevant information from outsiders.
In Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), stock prices provide information about the managers actions and are therefore
useful for managerial incentive contracts. Marquez and Yilmaz (2008) examine tender o¤ers where shareholders
have information about the rm value that the raider does not have. In Dow and Gorton (1997), Foucault and
Gehrig (2008), and Goldstein and Guembel (2008), rms use information in stock prices to make investment
decisions. In the context of IPOs, Rock (1986), Benveniste and Spindt (1989), and Benveniste and Wilhelm
(1990) assume that investors have information about the rm that is unknown to the manager or underwriter.
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Stubben (2010)). Alternatively, blockholders can be better informed about the quality of a
particular director than the manager and hence, their votes may be useful for board-related
shareholder proposals, which account for 28% of governance-related proposals. Finally, some
proposals submitted by activist hedge funds are focused on strategic, operating, and nancing
practices of targeted rms - areas in which the hedge funds may have signicant expertise.
The discussion above suggests that by informed shareholders we implicitly mean large share-
holders and therefore, the number of shareholders, N , is typically small. Given that most
publicly traded U.S. companies have multiple blockholders, the assumption that there are at
least two informed shareholders (N > 1), which is needed for our results, is consistent with this
interpretation.11 At the end of Section I, we discuss that our results continue to hold for rms
where part of the shareholders are uninformed.
Shareholders have homogeneous preferences and maximize the value of the rm. Hence, if
the manager makes decision d with respect to the proposal and the state of the world is ; each
shareholders utility is v(d; ).12
In practice, most shareholder proposals are related to changes in corporate governance,
which have the potential to deprive the manager of his private benets of control. For example,
removal of a poison pill makes the manager more vulnerable to job loss by increasing the prob-
ability of a hostile takeover. Therefore, it is natural to assume that the manager is less inclined
to accept the proposal than shareholders. On the other hand, the managers compensation is
usually tied to rm value, which partly aligns his interests with those of shareholders. To in-
corporate these two features into the model, we assume that the managers preferences are a
weighted average of the proposal value to the rm and his private benets of control, which
he loses if the proposal is accepted. In particular, the managers utility function is given by
kMv(d; )  (1  kM)1fd=Ag: The parameter kM 2 [0; 1], which is common knowledge, measures
the extent to which the managers interests are aligned with those of shareholders. In the ex-
treme case when kM = 1; the managers and shareholdersinterests are perfectly aligned, while
for kM = 0 the manager only cares about his private benets and always wants the proposal to
11Edmans and Manso (2011) dene a blockholder as a shareholder with at least 5% of the rms equity and
document that 57% of rms in 2001 had multiple outside blockholders, and 17% of rms had at least four
outside blockholders.
12In the Internet Appendix, we analyze an extension of the model where in addition to their concern about
the value of the rm, shareholders are also reluctant to vote in favor of the proposal for fear of managerial
retaliation.
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be rejected.
The timeline of the model is as follows. At the rst stage, the proposal is exogenously put
to a vote. Shareholders privately observe their signals and decide to vote "for" or "against"
the proposal. All votes are cast simultaneously, and shareholders cannot communicate their
private information prior to voting. Therefore, shareholders have to vote on the proposal
without knowing each others information. As standard in the literature on strategic voting,
we restrict attention to symmetric voting strategies. In particular, each shareholder follows a
mixed voting strategy
! = (!b; !g) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1] ; (2)
where !s is the probability of voting "for" (the complement being the probability of voting
"against") after receiving signal s 2 fb; gg. The outcome of the vote is public and is character-
ized by T 2 [0; N ]; which is the number of shareholders who voted a¢ rmatively.
At the second stage, once T is revealed, the ultimate decision whether to accept or to reject
the proposal is made by the manager. Thus, a key assumption of our model is that regardless
of shareholder support for the proposal, the vote outcome does not bind the management of
the rm. We denote the managers strategy by
dM(T ) : f0; 1; :::; Ng ! fA;Rg; (3)
where dM(T ) is the decision the manager makes after observing T a¢ rmative votes. Without
loss of generality, we assume that if the manager is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting
the proposal, he rejects it.
We summarize the timeline of the game as follows. First, shareholders observe their private
signals and then vote. After the vote outcome is made public, the manager decides whether or
not to accept the proposal based on the vote tally. Finally, the state of the world is realized,
and all agents receive their payo¤s.
B Equilibrium Analysis
We consider the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Suppose that in equilibrium shareholders
follow a voting strategy ! = (!b; !g), and the manager follows a decision rule dM (T ). We say
11
that an equilibrium is responsive if shareholder support for the proposal has an impact on the
managers decision regarding the proposal. This denition implies that every shareholder is
pivotal with a strictly positive probability, i.e., his decision to vote for or against the proposal
might change the outcome. Formally,
DEFINITION 1: An equilibrium (!; dM ()) is responsive if there exist T1; T2 2 f0; 1; :::; Ng
such that dM (T1) 6= dM (T2).
It follows that in any responsive equilibrium !b 6= !g. That is, shareholdersvoting behavior
depends on the signal they receive, and hence, their private information is conveyed through
the vote. Otherwise, if !b = !g, the vote tally does not convey any relevant information about
the value of the proposal, and therefore, the manager has no reason to change his decision based
on the vote.
It is important to note that a non-responsive equilibrium always exists in our setting. For
example, voting strategies (!b; !g) =
 
1
2
; 1
2

form an equilibrium. The manager understands
that votes do not convey any information and hence, ignores the vote tally and always rejects
the proposal. Realizing that, shareholders are indi¤erent between voting for and against the
proposal, and thus, strategies
 
1
2
; 1
2

are indeed optimal and constitute an equilibrium. Note,
however, that non-responsive equilibria are ine¢ cient in the following sense. Since the nal
decision does not reect shareholdersprivate information, there is a high probability of taking
the wrong action, i.e., rejecting the proposal in the good state of the world or accepting it in
the bad state. For this reason, we are mostly interested in responsive equilibria. This selection
of equilibria is standard in the literature.
We focus on equilibria where shareholders with a good signal are more likely to vote for
the proposal than shareholders with a bad signal, i.e., !b  !g.13 In these equilibria, more
a¢ rmative votes are a stronger indication that the state of nature is good. In other words,
if ! (T ) is the posterior belief that the state is good conditional on the vote tally, ! (T ) 
13Formally, since voting is nonbinding, for any equilibrium of this type there exists a corresponding equilibrium
with !b  !g: In this equilibrium voting for the proposal is relabeled with voting against the proposal. The
manager takes into account that shareholders with a bad signal vote a¢ rmatively more often and correctly
infers the distribution of positive signals. Hence, the two types of equilibria have exactly the same properties,
and we only focus on the rst type of equilibria.
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Pr [ = G j T ] ; then ! (T ) is increasing in T: We use a subscript ! to indicate that the way
posterior beliefs are updated depends on the equilibrium voting strategies ! = (!b; !g).
Given the voting strategies of shareholders, there is a one-to-one correspondence, ! (),
between the posterior belief that the state is good, and the number of a¢ rmative votes for the
proposal, presented by the following lemma.14
LEMMA 1: Let ! = (!b; !g) be shareholdersvoting strategies such that !g > !b. Then there
exists an increasing function ! () such that the posterior belief that the state is good equals 
if and only if ! () voters have voted a¢ rmatively.
Ex-post, shareholders prefer the proposal to be accepted if and only if Pr[ = G j T ] 
0:5: Hence, ! (0:5) can be considered the voting requirement that optimally implements the
shareholdersobjective.
To nd responsive equilibria of the game, we solve the model by backward induction. First,
we x shareholdersvoting strategies (!b; !g) with !b < !g and analyze the managers decision
whether to approve the proposal given the vote tally. Then, we consider shareholders, who
decide how to vote foreseeing the managers reaction to their votes, and formulate conditions
for strategies (!b; !g) to be optimal.
B.1 Managers Approval Decision
Consider the managers decision whether to accept the proposal. If the manager had no
conict of interest with shareholders, he would accept the proposal if and only if the posterior
belief that the state is good was greater than 0:5. However, because of the conict of interest,
the manager may prefer to reject the proposal even if the posterior belief is greater than 0:5.
We show below that in equilibrium the manager follows a threshold strategy and accepts the
proposal if and only if his posterior belief is greater than a cuto¤ , which translates into a
cuto¤ number of shareholders supporting the proposal, T ! :
14The function ! () ; which is the inverse of the function ! (), may not be an integer for various values
of  and !. Nevertheless, we refer to ! () as the number of a¢ rmative votes that is required for a posterior
belief , and deal with this technicality in Lemma 2.
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LEMMA 2 (Endogenous Voting Threshold): Suppose that shareholdersvoting strategies are
(!b; !g) with !g > !b; and let 
  1
2kM
. Then the manager accepts the proposal if and only if
the number of a¢ rmative votes is strictly greater than T ! ; where T

!  b! ()c.15
It follows that the manager is (weakly) more likely to accept the proposal if it receives
stronger support from shareholders. Intuitively, in order to approve the proposal and forego
his private benets, the manager requires strong evidence that rejection of the proposal is truly
suboptimal. Note also that the manager rejects some value increasing proposals ( > 1
2
) if and
only if he is biased (kM < 1). Last, note that T ! is essentially the endogenous voting threshold,
which depends on the conict of interest between the shareholders and the manager.
B.2 Existence of a Responsive Equilibrium
At the voting stage, shareholders observe their private signals and then decide how to vote,
comparing the expected benet from voting "for" to the expected benet from voting "against"
the proposal. When a shareholder votes strategically, he takes into account that his decision
has an e¤ect on his utility only in certain events - those where the shareholders vote is pivotal
for the nal outcome. Therefore, an informed shareholder rationally conditions his decision not
only on his private signal, but also on the information that must be true when he is pivotal.
In the current setting, a shareholder is only pivotal if his vote induces the manager to accept
the proposal. Because the manager follows a decision rule T ! , the shareholder is pivotal if and
only if the number of a¢ rmative votes among other shareholders is exactly T ! .
As was shown above, non-responsive equilibria always exist in this setting. However, our
next result demonstrates that unless the managers preferences are closely aligned with those
of shareholders, these are the only possible equilibria and hence, the nonbinding vote fails to
have any impact on the managers decision.
For the ease of exposition, we assume from now on that N is even. If N is odd, all the
results remain the same except for a slight change in the constants in the formulations. In the
Appendix we consider both cases simultaneously.
THEOREM 1: A responsive equilibrium exists if and only if kM > 12 +
1
2

1 

2
:
15We use bxc to denote the highest possible integer that is smaller or equal to x.
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To understand the intuition behind Theorem 1, recall that a shareholder conditions his
decision on his private signal and on the event when his vote is pivotal, i.e., when the number
of a¢ rmative votes among other shareholders equals T ! : By construction, when the number
of a¢ rmative votes is T ! ; the managers posterior belief that the state is good is close to 
.
Then, conditional on being pivotal, the shareholders posterior belief that the state is good is
also close to . To see why this is true, consider a responsive equilibrium in pure strategies, in
which every shareholder votes for the proposal if and only if his signal is good (the argument
for mixed strategy equilibria is similar). Suppose that the shareholders own signal is bad.
Conditional on being pivotal, such shareholder knows with certainty that there are T ! good
signals among the remaining N   1 shareholders. Combining it with his own bad signal, he
realizes that there are exactly T ! good signals out of all N signals. The manager who observes
T ! a¢ rmative votes, infers that there are exactly T

! good signals among all N shareholders and
hence, has exactly the same information as the shareholder with a bad signal. Therefore, both
the manager who observes T ! a¢ rmative votes and the pivotal shareholder with a bad signal
share exactly the same posterior belief, which by construction is close to . If the conict of
interest between the manager and shareholders is su¢ ciently strong (kM is low), then 
 = 1
2kM
is signicantly greater than 0:5; and hence, the pivotal shareholder believes that the proposal
is strictly benecial for the company even though his own private signal is bad. A shareholder
with a good signal is even more inclined towards the proposal. Thus, each shareholder prefers
the proposal to be accepted and votes a¢ rmatively regardless of his signal, which contradicts
the existence of this equilibrium. This intuition is similar to the intuition behind the result of
Morgan and Stocken (2008) that information is not well aggregated for su¢ ciently large polls
when constituents have diverse ideologies.
Several comments are in place. First, as follows from the proof of Theorem 1, when a
responsive equilibrium exists, it may not be unique. In particular, in addition to a pure strategy
equilibrium, which always exists for any kM > 12 +
1
2
(1 

)2, there also exist mixed strategy
equilibria for some values of kM in this range.
Second, our result that nonbinding voting may fail to aggregate shareholdersinformation
does not depend on the number of shareholders, N; and continues to hold even if the number
of shareholders is large. This contrasts a well-known result by Feddersen and Pesendorfer
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(1998), who show that the probability of making the wrong decision converges to zero as the
population of voters increases. The key to understanding the fundamental di¤erence between
the models is the following. In binding voting, the voting threshold needed for proposal approval
is determined exogenously. Given the voting threshold, shareholders nd their optimal voting
strategies, and this in turn determines the posterior belief conditional on being pivotal for the
outcome. Hence, the posterior belief conditional on being pivotal, which is the main factor that
guides shareholders how to vote, is a¤ected by the number of voters and their strategies. As a
result, there might exist an equilibrium in which information is aggregated. By contrast, in a
nonbinding vote, the posterior belief conditional on being pivotal is determined by the managers
preferences. Given this posterior belief, shareholders nd their optimal voting strategies, which
in turn determine the endogenous voting threshold. It follows that regardless of shareholders
voting strategies and regardless of the number of shareholders, the posterior belief conditional
on being pivotal is always close to ; the managers threshold belief. When this threshold
belief is su¢ ciently di¤erent from 0:5, any equilibrium must be non-responsive.
Third, to simplify the analysis, we have ignored the possibility that the manager may have
private information about the value of the proposal and that some shareholders may be com-
pletely uninformed. However, our result that nonbinding voting fails to aggregate shareholders
information when the manager is su¢ ciently biased, continues to hold even in those situa-
tions. The only necessary condition is that at least some shareholders have information that
is incremental to the managers information and that the manager could use to make a more
knowledgeable decision. Intuitively, if the manager is informed, then shareholders, when voting,
also condition on the private information that the manager must have when they are pivotal
for his decision. Alternatively, if some shareholders are uninformed and vote in a particular
direction (for example, always vote with the management) or even randomly, then both the
manager and informed shareholders "clean out" these uninformative votes from the vote tally
when making their inference. In both cases, a pivotal shareholder has roughly the same infor-
mation and posterior belief as the manager when the manager is indi¤erent between accepting
and rejecting the proposal. The same logic that leads to Theorem 1 then implies that nonbind-
ing voting fails to aggregate shareholdersinformation when the preferences of shareholders and
the manager are not closely aligned. Hence, our model can be applied to widely held rms,
even if the number of informed shareholders is relatively small and the manager has relevant
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information about the value of the proposal.
Finally, the concept of nonbinding voting is related to the role of veto power under binding
voting.16 In both cases, a sole decision maker can maintain the status quo even if the majority
of voters register their support for the proposal. In contrast to nonbinding voting, however,
the agent with veto power cannot change the status quo (accept the proposal) if the majority
of voters oppose it. Therefore, and unlike the full authority that the companys management
retains in nonbinding voting, the agent with veto power does not have full discretion over the
nal decision, which leads to di¤erent implications for information aggregation. In particular,
our result that there is no responsive equilibrium in nonbinding voting when the conict of
interest between the manager and shareholders is signicant, does not depend on the direction
of the managers bias: it is also valid when the manager is biased towards accepting the proposal
relative to shareholders. In contrast, under veto power and a pure majority rule, there is no
responsive equilibrium only if the agent with veto power is biased against the proposal, whereas
if he is biased towards the proposal, a responsive equilibrium exists.
II Managerial Discipline
In our basic model, the manager can disregard a shareholder proposal without facing any
consequences, even if the proposal is supported by the majority of shareholders. However,
corporate decision makers of public rms are often subject to implicit discipline if it becomes
evident that they have failed to act in the best interests of shareholders. For example, dissat-
isfaction with the management may encourage activist investors to wage formal proxy ghts,
motivate potential raiders to launch tender o¤ers, or induce large shareholders to vote with their
feet and follow the "Wall Street Walk" (see Admati and Peiderer (2009) and Edmans (2009)).
Alternatively, opportunistic behavior by the manager can result in "just vote no" campaigns
(see Del Guercio, Seery and Woidtke (2008)), negative recommendations by proxy advisory
rms for future management proposals, submission of binding bylaw amendments, or even lob-
bying for regulatory change. Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), and Grundfest (1993)
argue that the labor market penalizes suboptimal behavior and thereby provides incentives for
16We are grateful to the referee for pointing out the connection of nonbinding voting to veto power. The
paper that is most closely related to the role of veto power in strategic voting is Maug and Yilmaz (2002) on
two-class voting. A special case of their model could be interpreted as an example of veto power.
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directors to develop their reputation as e¤ective monitors. Last, stronger voting support for a
proposal is likely to attract greater press coverage, increasing the political costs from ignoring
the vote. Some evidence in support of managerial discipline is provided by Ertimur, Ferri, and
Stubben (2010), who nd a one-fth reduction in the probability of director turnover at the
targeted rm after the implementation of majority-supported shareholder proposals.
The common feature of all these mechanisms is that they can impose discipline on the
manager and make him more responsive to shareholder proposals. We incorporate this feature
into our model by introducing an activist investor who can organize a proxy ght to discipline
the manager. We focus on the proxy ght mechanism because it is a direct mechanism through
which activists can inuence and discipline the management. Indeed, a successful proxy ght
removes the incumbent board from its position. However, as described below, we model the
proxy ght in a reduced form. Therefore, it can be given a broader interpretation of any
corporate intervention technology that has binding implications on the management.
We allow the activists preferences to be di¤erent from those of shareholders. In particular,
the activist may have private benets from the proposal that are not shared with other share-
holders and hence, be more biased towards accepting the proposal. For example, as discussed
in the introduction, private benets may arise from short-termist strategies of certain activist
investors or from labor goals pursued by union fund managers. The proxy campaign organized
by CalPERS to remove Safeways CEO and Chairman Steven Bird from his position is a well-
known example of the use of shareholder activism to pursue labor goals (see, e.g., Los Angeles
Times, "Backlash Confronts CalPERS", May 20, 2004, p. C1). Finally, private benets can
also come from the supportive media publicity surrounding proposals to limit executive com-
pensation or increase board diversity, which are likely to enhance the political reputation of
fund managers. It is key to our results that the managers and the activists private benets
from the proposal go in opposite directions. Otherwise, as will become clear later, the only
possible equilibria are non-responsive ones.
In what follows, we demonstrate that the presence of an activist investor leads to a responsive
equilibrium only if the activist is su¢ ciently biased towards accepting the proposal.
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A Modied Setup
We augment the model with a third stage. At the third stage, the activist investor observes
the outcome of the vote and the managers approval decision, and only then decides whether
to incur solicitation costs cA > 0 in order to organize a proxy ght.17 Thus, potentially,
the nonbinding vote has an advisory role not only for the manager, but also for the activist.
Without loss of generality, we assume that if the activist is indi¤erent between initiating and
not initiating the proxy ght, she does not initiate it. A proxy ght succeeds with probability
 2 (0; 1]: A successful proxy ght has two implications. First, it imposes a cost cM > 0 on
the manager. For example, the manager can be removed from his position, and his reputation
might be damaged. Second, the proxy ght reverses the managers decision: if the manager
rejected the proposal, a successful proxy ght results in its approval, and vice versa.
To focus attention on the impact of shareholder voting and abstract from signaling consid-
erations, we assume that neither the manager nor the activist have private information. Under
this assumption, the activists vote will be fully predicted by other participants and therefore,
will not a¤ect aggregation of information. Thus, we assume for simplicity that the activist does
not participate in the nonbinding vote.18
Last, the activists preferences are given by kAv(d; ) + (1   kA)1fd=Ag; where d repre-
sents whether the proposal is eventually accepted (d = A) or rejected (d = R) ; and kA 2
[0; 1] measures the conict of interest between the activist and shareholders.19 Parameter
kA is common knowledge. If kA = 1; then the interests of the activist are perfectly aligned
with those of shareholders. If kA < 1; then the activist is more biased towards approving the
proposal than shareholders.
17Formally, the activists strategy is given by e (T; dM ) : f0; 1; :::; Ng  fA;Rg ! f0; 1g, where e (T; dM )
equals 1 if the activist organizes a proxy ght, and equals 0 otherwise.
18If the activist is privately informed and participates in the vote, the analysis becomes less tractable. In
particular, the activists voting strategy could be di¤erent from that of other shareholders since the activist
internalizes the cost of organizing a proxy ght. Besides, she knows more than other shareholders about the
probability that a proxy ght will be organized (the activist has private information, which a¤ects her incentives
to organize a proxy ght). Since the activist may follow a di¤erent voting strategy, the managers inference
from the vote would crucially depend on whether the activists vote is observable or not. We believe that our
results would not change signicantly under this alternative setup, but showing that requires a formal analysis.
19Here d is the nal decision that is taken after the proxy ght, if it is organized. Shareholders, managers,
and activists preferences are a¤ected by the prole strategies (!; dM ; e), where e, dened in footnote 16, is the
activists decision whether to launch a proxy ght. The exposition is straightforward from the description above
and is thus relegated to the Internet Appendix.
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B Analysis
Our model emphasizes that if any information is conveyed in the nonbinding vote, the
activist will use it when deciding whether to organize a proxy ght.
Consider the activists decision to organize a proxy ght given that T shareholders voted
for the proposal and the managers action. Our rst observation is that since the manager is
more inclined than the activist to reject the proposal, the activist never initiates a proxy ght
when the manager accepts the proposal. Instead, the activist launches a proxy ght only when
the manager rejects the proposal and the vote tally indicates that the probability that the state
is good is su¢ ciently high.
More specically, the activists incentives to initiate a proxy ght are balanced by two di¤er-
ent considerations. First, initiation of a proxy ght is costly for the activist (cA > 0). Hence, it
only pays o¤when there is su¢ ciently strong evidence that the managers decision to reject the
proposal is detrimental for shareholder value. In other words, when the posterior belief ! (T )
is higher but close from above to 0:5, an unbiased activist (kA = 1) refrains from organizing
a proxy ght and leaves the decision to the manager. Second, the activist extracts private
benets from the approval of the proposal regardless of the value it delivers to shareholders.
Thus, a su¢ ciently biased activist would like the proposal to be accepted even if shareholders
strictly prefer its rejection. Combining these considerations, we show that the activist follows
a threshold strategy and initiates a proxy ght to reverse the managers rejection decision if
and only if ! (T ) >
1
2
+ 1
2kA
 
kA    cA

(see auxiliary Lemma B.1 in the Appendix).
The managers decision whether to accept the proposal must account for the activists
intervention. We show that similarly to the basic model, the manager follows a threshold
strategy and accepts the proposal if and only if his posterior belief that the state is good
exceeds some cuto¤ , which results in an endogenous voting threshold T ! = b! ()c (see
auxiliary Lemma B.2 in the Appendix). The threshold arises due to a combination of two
e¤ects. First, as in the basic model, the manager cares about shareholder value and therefore,
prefers to accept the proposal if there is su¢ ciently strong evidence that it is value increasing.
The threat of a proxy ght by the activist investor adds an additional force. The greater is the
posterior belief that the proposal is value increasing, the greater is the risk of the proxy ght if
the manager rejects the proposal, which makes him more willing to accept the proposal. Note
that the threshold  now depends not only on the conict of interest between the manager
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and shareholders (kM), but also on the proxy ght technology (cA; cM ; ) and the activists
preferences (kA).
Despite her ability to organize a proxy ght, an activist whose preferences are strongly
aligned with those of shareholders fails to impose su¢ cient discipline on an opportunistic man-
ager in the following sense.
LEMMA 3: If the activist is su¢ ciently unbiased ( kA >  cA ), an opportunistic manager
( kM < 1) rejects some value increasing proposals (
 > 1
2
) without facing a proxy ght. If the
activist is biased ( kA   cA ), then the activist always organizes a proxy ght whenever the
manager rejects a value increasing proposal.
Intuitively, when the activists private benets are su¢ ciently small, the cost cA prevents her
from organizing a proxy ght, which leaves some discretion to the manager. If the manager is in
conict of interest with shareholders, he exploits this discretion by rejecting the proposal even
when shareholders would like him to approve it. In contrast, when the activist is su¢ ciently
biased towards the proposal, she is willing to organize a proxy ght whenever the manager
rejects the proposal that is likely to be value increasing.
Recall from Theorem 1 that in the absence of managerial discipline, a responsive equilibrium
does not exist if the manager is biased, kM  12 +
1
2
(1 

)2. We next examine under what
conditions the presence of an activist investor can alleviate this problem. Our next result
shows that, if the activists private benets are su¢ ciently small (but not necessarily zero), all
possible equilibria are still non-responsive.
THEOREM 2: Suppose that the manager is in su¢ cient conict of interest with shareholders,
kM  12 +
1
2
(1 

)2, and that the costs of organizing a proxy ght are non negligible, cA >
cA   2 12+(1 )2 . If the activist is su¢ ciently unbiased, kA 
 cA
 cA
, then all equilibria are non-
responsive.
Theorem 2 emphasizes that the problem of uninformative voting, which arises due to the
managers bias, is not alleviated by the presence of an activist investor if the activists interests
are aligned with those of shareholders. To see the intuition behind this result, notice that
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when voting, shareholders can now be pivotal not only for the managers decision to approve
the proposal, but also for the activists decision to initiate a proxy ght. Recall from the
discussion after Theorem 1 that when a shareholder is pivotal for the managers decision, the
posterior belief that the state is good is close to , the managers threshold belief. By a similar
argument, when a shareholder is pivotal for the activists decision, the posterior belief is around
1
2
+ 1
2kA
 
kA    cA

, the activists threshold belief. Under the assumptions of Theorem 2, each
of these posterior beliefs is strictly greater than 0:5. Following a reasoning similar to the one in
the basic model, shareholders will not vote according to their signals since the events of being
pivotal for the activist and the manager both provide strong indication that the state is good.
However, if the activists private benets from accepting the proposal are signicant, she
is willing to organize a proxy ght even when the evidence in favor of the proposal is weak.
E¤ectively, since the activists and managers biases are in the opposite directions, the activists
over tendency to approve the proposal counteracts the managers inclination to reject the
proposal too often. This leads to a balanced decision rule such that conditional on being pivotal,
shareholders are neither too optimistic, nor too pessimistic about the proposal. Shareholders
therefore have incentives to use their own signals when deciding how to vote, and the vote
becomes informative about shareholder expectations. Theorem 3 below formalizes this intuition
and shows that if the manager is biased, the presence of a su¢ ciently biased activist investor
ensures existence of a responsive equilibrium.
THEOREM 3: Suppose that the manager is biased, kM  12 +
1
2
(1 

)2 and that the costs of
organizing a proxy ght are moderate, cA 2 (cA; ). Then,
(i) If the proxy ght is su¢ ciently costly to the manager ( cM  cM  1  ), there exists a
responsive equilibrium if and only if
kA 2
"
  cA
  cA

1  

2
;
  cA
  cA
!
: (4)
In this equilibrium the proxy ght is never organized.
(ii) If the proxy ght is su¢ ciently costless to the manager ( cM < cM), then
(ii:a) If kM >

1  cM
cM
 h
1
2
+ 1
2
(1 

)2
i
; there exists a responsive equilibrium if (4) holds.
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(ii:b) If kM 

1  cM
cM
 h
1
2
+ 1
2
(1 

)2
i
; there exists a responsive equilibrium if
kA 2

  cA

;
  cA

1
2 (1  )

: (5)
In this equilibrium the proxy ght is organized with a strictly positive probability.
When cA > cA, the upper bounds in (4) and (5) are strictly smaller than one, which
emphasizes that the activist has to be su¢ ciently biased in order for a responsive equilibrium
to exist.
Theorem 3 demonstrates that the presence of managerial discipline can enhance the advisory
role of nonbinding votes even if a proxy ght is never organized in equilibrium. In particular,
when the managers costs from the proxy ght are high, the threat of a proxy ght induces him
to accept the proposal more often. This decreases the managers threshold belief , moving it
closer to the shareholders threshold belief 0:5. As a result, the shareholdersposterior belief
conditional on being pivotal for the managers decision is around 0:5, giving them incentives to
vote according to their private information.
However, when the proxy ght is relatively costless to the manager, the threat itself might
be insu¢ cient to deter managerial misbehavior, and the proxy ght has to occur in equilibrium
to ensure informative voting by shareholders. This is because the managers threshold belief
 is still su¢ ciently high, so that conditional on being pivotal for the managers decision
shareholders are optimistic and always prefer to vote for the proposal. Hence, in order for
shareholders to have incentives to use their private information, they have to be sometimes
pivotal for the activists decision to organize a proxy ght, when their posterior beliefs are
lower.
Theorem 3 emphasizes that when solicitation costs are moderate, the presence of a biased
activist can improve information aggregation in nonbinding voting. Aggregation of information
is important since it allows more informed decision making and hence, increases shareholder
welfare. Indeed, in any non-responsive equilibrium, the decision rule is highly ine¢ cient because
the manager rejects the proposal regardless of the state of the world. In contrast, in a responsive
equilibrium, the proposal is accepted with a higher probability if shareholder support is higher,
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indicating that the state is more likely to be good. Surprisingly, this implies that under the
assumptions of Theorem 3, shareholders may ex-ante prefer a biased activist to an unbiased
one:
COROLLARY 1: If kM  12 +
1
2
(1 

)2 and cA 2 (cA; ), then shareholders strictly prefer a
biased activist (with kA = 1  cA=) over an unbiased activist ( kA = 1).
Note, however, that if the manager is unbiased so that a responsive equilibrium exists in
the absence of managerial discipline, then the presence of a biased activist may actually harm
the advisory role of nonbinding votes by inducing shareholders to vote against the proposal
regardless of their signals. This observation emphasizes that the bias of an activist investor can
only be benecial if the manager is biased as well.
Our results rely on the assumption that the costs of organizing a proxy ght are moderate:
cA 2 (cA; ). In practice, the costs of organizing a proxy ght stem from soliciting shareholders
to vote for the alternative slate of directors. To attract shareholdersattention and gain their
support, the activist must run a high prole campaign, which involves hiring professional proxy
solicitors, public relations experts, and legal counsel. These costs are often a barrier that
discourages challengers from engaging in this type of activism. Yet, we do occasionally observe
proxy ghts taking place, at least in the U.S., implying that solicitation costs are not high
enough to deter proxy ghts completely. Moreover, a proxy ght need not take place in order
to impose discipline on the board. The credible threat of initiating a proxy ght may by itself
be su¢ cient to make the board more accountable to shareholders. Overall, we believe that our
assumption is reasonable.
To see why this assumption is necessary, consider two extreme cases. Suppose rst that
the activist is unbiased, the cost of organizing a proxy ght is zero, and the damage to the
manager from a successful proxy ght is substantial. In this setting a responsive equilibrium
always exists, which explains why a lower bound on cA is necessary for Theorem 2 to hold.
Indeed, since the activist is unbiased and has no costs of intervention, she initiates a proxy
ght whenever the manager takes an action that is ex-post suboptimal for shareholders. The
manager realizes this and, in order to avoid the detrimental consequences of a proxy ght,
implements the shareholdersoptimal decision rule regardless of his own preferences:  = 0:5.
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Therefore, shareholders have incentives to vote according to their private information, and a
responsive equilibrium exists. By contrast, suppose that the cost of initiating a proxy ght is
very large. Clearly, the activist never launches a proxy ght regardless of her preferences, and
the model is reduced to the setting of Section I. By Theorem 1, no responsive equilibrium exists
when the manager is su¢ ciently biased, which explains why an upper bound on cA is necessary
for Theorem 3 to hold.
III Comparative Statics
Central to our analysis is the existence of the endogenous voting threshold T ! (Lemma
2). Indeed, our results indicate that in any responsive equilibrium the management is more
likely to implement the proposal if it receives stronger shareholder support, other factors equal.
This result is consistent with the observed empirical evidence on board responsiveness. Ertimur,
Ferri, and Stubben (2010) and Thomas and Cotter (2007) document a positive relation between
the percentage of votes in favor of the proposal and the likelihood of its implementation for
a broad sample of shareholder proposals. Ferri and Sandino (2009) nd similar evidence for
shareholder proposals to expense employee stock options.
Our results also suggest that the endogenous voting threshold T ! is a function of the struc-
ture of managerial compensation, the degree of managerial entrenchment, proposal character-
istics, and the activists bias.20 More specically, the following comparative statics hold. Given
the potential multiplicity of equilibria, we focus on the pure strategy equilibrium, which is the
most informative of all equilibria, and present comparative statics results for this equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that a pure strategy responsive equilibrium exists. Then, the
endogenous voting threshold T !
(i) increases with the conict between shareholders and the manager (decreases with kM),
(ii) decreases with the conict between shareholders and the activist (increases with kA),
(iii) decreases with the cost of a proxy ght to the manager ( cM),
20The endogenous voting threshold is also a function of the number of shareholders N . However, T

!
N e¤ectively
does not depend on N .
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(iv) increases with solicitation costs ( cA),
(v) decreases with the probability that a proxy ght succeeds ().
Proposition 1 provides new insight about the relation between company and proposal char-
acteristics and the likelihood that the proposal is implemented.
First, the model predicts that for a given level of shareholder support, the proposal is
more likely to be implemented in companies with a lower degree of conict of interest between
shareholders and the manager (higher kM). The degree of conict of interest is a¤ected by the
sensitivity of CEO compensation to rm performance, which can be measured by the amount
and types of options, equity, restricted stock, and bonuses that compose the CEO compensation
package.
Second, Proposition 1 implies that when the consequences of a proxy ght are harmful for
the rms management (cM is high), the likelihood that the proposal is implemented is higher.
A successful proxy ght is particulary harmful for the companys manager if the probability of
nding a new job with at least the same level of compensation and prestige is low. Thus, the
damage from a proxy ght can be estimated by the level of excess compensation that the CEO
receives relative to comparable CEOs in the industry. Another proxy could be the age of the
CEO because older CEOs are closer to retirement and hence have less career concerns.
Third, high solicitation costs (cA) reduce the discipline that the activist imposes on the
manager, and hence decrease the likelihood that shareholder proposals are implemented. So-
licitation costs are likely to be higher in companies whose ownership is more di¤used (e.g., the
percentage of institutional ownership is low), or whose stocks have a higher turnover rate (if
shareholders are changing frequently, it becomes more di¢ cult to isolate current voting share-
holders, as discussed in Pound (1988)). Note also that the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) has taken steps to allow easier proxy solicitation by activist investors. First, on August
25, 2010, the SEC approved the proxy access rule, which, under certain circumstances, pro-
vides shareholders with the right to include their director nominees on the companys proxy
statement. In addition, the SEC is considering facilitating proxy solicitation through the In-
ternet for soliciting persons other than the issuer.21 Because these changes are expected to
21See, for example, the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation,
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decrease activistssolicitation costs, the model predicts that shareholder proposals will be more
frequently implemented after these amendments take e¤ect.
Following a similar logic, shareholder proposals should be implemented more frequently if
proxy ghts, once initiated, are more likely to be successful (higher ). On July 1, 2009, the
SEC approved elimination of broker discretionary voting in the election of directors at annual
meetings.22 Because, traditionally, these votes supported the incumbents slate of directors,
elimination of broker non-votes is likely to increase . The model therefore predicts that the
likelihood that shareholder proposals are approved should be higher in the period following the
adoption of the new rule.
Finally, the structure of the model also allows us to predict the frequency of proxy ghts
in the context of shareholder proposals. A proxy ght occurs in equilibrium with a positive
probability whenever the managers preferences are su¢ ciently misaligned. In this case, the
manager rejects the proposal too often, even if it is likely to trigger a proxy ght. Alternatively,
if the activist is highly biased in favor of accepting the proposal, even responsive behavior by
the manager does not discourage her from organizing a proxy ght. Thus, our analysis predicts
the relation between rm characteristics (using similar proxies as above) and the probability of
observing a proxy ght. The following proposition summarizes our ndings.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose that a pure strategy responsive equilibrium exists. Then, the ex-
ante probability of a proxy ght
(i) increases with the conict of interest between shareholders and the manager, and between
shareholders and the activist (decreases with kM and kA),
(ii) decreases with the costs of a proxy ght to the manager ( cM) and solicitation costs ( cA).
IV Binding vs. Nonbinding Voting
In this section we compare the relative e¢ ciency of nonbinding and binding voting mech-
anisms. Unlike the nonbinding mechanism that has been introduced in this study, a binding
"Proxy Solicitation Through the Internet", October 27, 2009.
22See the SECs press release at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-147.htm.
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vote implies that a predetermined enforceable voting rule based on the vote tally determines
whether the proposal is accepted. Therefore, in binding voting, neither the manager nor the
board have any discretion over the approval of the proposal. As has already been mentioned
in the introduction, most shareholder-initiated proposals are nonbinding. Would shareholders
prefer voting for their proposals to be binding if they had a choice?
Our previous analysis demonstrates that nonbinding voting is virtually binding with a voting
threshold endogenously determined by di¤erent company and proposal characteristics. Below
we show that if the designer of the mechanism has the exibility to tailor the voting threshold
to each company and proposal, then the binding mechanism could perform better.
LEMMA 4: Suppose that ! and T ! are shareholdersvoting strategies and the corresponding
endogenous threshold that arise in equilibrium of the nonbinding voting mechanism. Then !
also form an equilibrium in a binding voting mechanism with a voting threshold T !.
In other words, any responsive equilibrium in the nonbinding mechanism is also an equilib-
rium in the binding mechanism with the corresponding voting threshold, and hence, the binding
mechanism may seem superior. However, this reasoning implicitly assumes that the designer
of the binding mechanism has the knowledge of all rm-specic characteristics and can easily
adjust the voting threshold to these parameters.
In practice, the distribution of statutory voting rules is extremely concentrated. In par-
ticular, Maug and Rydqvist (2009) show that 96% of companies in their sample follow a pure
majority rule in binding voting for management-initiated proposals. Clearly, these companies
are heterogeneous, but despite their freedom to change the voting rule, they choose not to do
so. Moreover, statutory voting rules are chosen a long time before the vote and apply to broad
classes of proposals, so they are certainly not tailored to individual proposals. Therefore, if a
binding mechanism is, for any reason, restricted to some subset of voting rules, it leaves an
opportunity for the nonbinding mechanism to be superior. Below we provide some conditions
when this is the case.
Let us compare a binding mechanism with a pure majority rule (50%) and the nonbinding
mechanism considered in the paper. We now deviate from the assumption of the main model
that the prior belief that the state is good is 0.5. In particular, suppose that the prior probability
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that the state is good, , is 0.3. It is easy to see that in a binding mechanism with a pure
majority rule there is no equilibrium in which information is fully aggregated, i.e., in which
shareholders play pure strategies and vote according to their private signals. Intuitively, in
such equilibrium, being pivotal implies that half of the population has a bad signal, and the
other half has a good signal. Thus, the posterior belief about the state of the world roughly
equals the prior, which is 0.3. Since shareholders prefer the proposal to be accepted if and
only if the posterior is greater than 0.5, being pivotal makes shareholders pessimistic about the
proposal and induces them to vote against it regardless of their private information. Therefore,
information is not fully aggregated in any equilibrium.
By contrast, in nonbinding voting, a responsive equilibrium in pure strategies exists when-
ever the managers interests are su¢ ciently aligned with those of shareholders (kM is close to 1).
This result follows from repeating the proof of Theorem 1 for the case of general priors: prior
beliefs do not change the results because the managers and shareholdersdecisions are based
only on the posterior beliefs. Intuitively, when the conict of interest between the manager and
shareholders is relatively small, the manager follows a threshold rule such that the posterior
belief in the event of being pivotal is close to 0.5. Therefore, information is well aggregated in
the nonbinding voting mechanism, and the proposal is approved when it is e¢ cient to do so.
More generally, as we show in the following proposition, the probability of making the
correct decision is strictly higher under nonbinding voting than under binding voting with a
pure majority rule whenever the manager is su¢ ciently unbiased and the prior beliefs that the
state is good are either su¢ ciently optimistic or su¢ ciently pessimistic.
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose that the prior probability that the state is good, ; satises 
1  62
((1 

)
N
2 ; ( 
1 )
N
2
+1) and kM > 12 +
1
2
(1 

)2. Then the probability of making the correct decision
is strictly higher under nonbinding voting than under binding voting with a pure majority rule.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that when the binding mechanism is restricted to a pure major-
ity rule and the managers interests are su¢ ciently aligned, shareholders may optimally choose
to have nonbinding voting instead. This result can explain why, although the Delaware law
permits submission of binding shareholder proposals requesting a majority voting standard for
director elections, this type of shareholder proposals has been mostly nonbinding. For example,
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in 2006, binding shareholder proposals requesting majority voting were included in the proxy
materials of only four companies, compared to more than 150 nonbinding proposals (see the
2006 Institutional Shareholder Services report (ISS (2006)). Proposition 3 might also provide
an explanation why, contrary to expectations, there are no signicant positive abnormal returns
for rms announcing the adoption of some form of majority voting (pure majority voting for
most of them) instead of plurality voting for director elections (see Sjostrom and Kim (2007)).
Before the adoption of the proxy access rule, plurality voting for directors was essentially non-
binding since in most cases the number of nominees was equal to or lower than the number of
positions on the board, and therefore, every nominee was elected independently of the fraction
of a¢ rmative votes cast for him. Finally, Proposition 3 is also consistent with Buchanan, Netter
and Yang (2010), who nd that U.S. shareholder proposals have a more signicant e¤ect than
their UK counterparts, although UK shareholder proposals are legally binding.
As a nal comment, note that for large N the condition in Proposition 3 is not satised,
and both mechanisms are equally e¢ cient. Indeed, information in binding voting is e¢ ciently
aggregated when the number of voters is innitely large (see, e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1998)). However, as discussed in Section I, N is interpreted as the number of blockholders of
the rm, which is typically small (this does not exclude the possibility that there are also many
uninformed shareholders). Therefore, the condition of Proposition 3 is likely to be satised in
our context.
V Concluding Remarks
This paper examines nonbinding voting for shareholder proposals. The main di¤erence of
nonbinding voting from the conventional binding voting mechanism is that the vote tally does
not, at least directly, determine the outcome. Instead, the manager has the discretion to decide
whether or not to accept the proposal, even if the majority of shareholders support it.
We show that in the absence of managerial discipline, nonbinding voting often fails to convey
shareholder views and therefore is disregarded by the companys management. Thus, share-
holder proposals do not always play their advisory role for the management. Our main result
demonstrates that the market for corporate control has the potential to enhance the advisory
role of nonbinding votes. In particular, nonbinding voting becomes e¤ective in conveying share-
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holder expectations if the companys management is subject to the threat of a proxy ght by
an activist investor, but only if there is su¢ cient conict of interest between the activist and
shareholders.
Altogether, the presence of an activist investor who can discipline the management can
improve information aggregation in nonbinding voting. One implication of this result is that
nonbinding shareholder proposals are likely to become more prominent if the number of share-
holder activists increases and their costs of organizing a proxy ght decrease. This prediction
is consistent with the recent contemporaneous increase in the number of shareholder proposals
and the number of proxy contests, as well as the rise of hedge funds. In particular, there were
91 proxy contests in 2006, compared to 40 in 2005 and 30 in 2004, and most of this increase has
been due to the growth of hedge funds engaged in such contests (see Gillan and Starks (2007)).
The analysis of this paper left out several important issues. First and foremost, the proposal
on the agenda is exogenous in our model. Shareholders can benet from submitting a proposal
if it has an advisory role for the companys management. However, the e¤ort, the cost of hiring
legal advisors, or the fear of managerial retaliation, might deter shareholders from submitting a
proposal. The tradeo¤ between these benets and costs may vary across shareholders, depend-
ing on their holdings in the company, the accuracy and content of their private information,
and their preferences. In the Internet Appendix we show that blockholders are those who are
most likely to submit shareholder proposals: because of their large holdings in the rm, their
benets from the proposal submission are su¢ ciently high to overcome the associated costs.
Second, activist investors are often large shareholders of the rm and are likely to be those
who sponsor proposals. We hypothesize that the positive e¤ect of the biased activists discipline
on the e¢ ciency of the voting process will exist even after taking into account her decision to
submit the proposal. Indeed, shareholders would infer from the proposal submission that the
activists bias is su¢ ciently large to overcome the costs of submission. If these costs are not too
high, then, similar to the reasoning that leads to Theorem 3, the presence of the biased activist
would benet shareholders overall. Nevertheless, if the agenda of the proposal is selected by
the activist investor, there is a concern that the set of proposals that are submitted to a vote
is pre-selected in a way that can harm shareholders. This and other important questions, such
as what kinds of proposals are more likely to be introduced, are left for future research.
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Appendix
Table I - Notations
kM Measure of the managers bias against the proposal (no bias if kM = 1)
kA Measure of the activists bias towards the proposal (no bias if kA = 1)
N Number of shareholders
 Precision of shareholderssignals
cA Costs to the activist from organizing a proxy ght (solicitation costs)
 Probability that a proxy ght is successful
cM Costs to the manager from a successful proxy ght
T Vote tally: number of votes in favor of the proposal
 The prior probability that the state is good ( = 0:5 in the main model)
! = (!g; !b) Shareholdersvoting strategy: !s = probability of voting "for", given signal s
dM (T ) Managers strategy: dM (T ) = 1 corresponds to accepting the proposal
e(T; dM) Activists strategy: e(T; dM) = 1 corresponds to initiating a proxy ght
! (T ) Posterior belief that the state is good given the vote tally T and voting strategy !
! () Number of a¢ rmative votes required to make the posterior belief equal to 
 Managers equilibrium threshold belief: he accepts the proposal if and only if ! (T ) > 

T ! Managers equilibrium voting threshold: he accepts the proposal if and only if T > T

!
TN;! The realized number of a¢ rmative votes among N shareholders given the voting strategy !
B (G) Probability that a shareholder votes "for" in state B (state G)
!;T  (s) Expected relative benet from voting "for", given signal s; threshold T  and strategy !
R
 
A

Posterior above (below) which the activist initiates a proxy ght upon rejection (approval)
NP
 
P

Posterior above which the manager accepts the proposal without (with) a proxy ght
CNT Binomial coe¢ cient: C
N
T =
N !
T !(N T )!
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Proofs for Section I
The Appendix includes only the proofs for selected results. All other proofs can be found in the
Internet Appendix. We start by proving Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Before proving Theorem 1, we
formulate an auxiliary Lemma A.1, which examines the best response function of a shareholder
to the managers strategy and the strategies of other shareholders. Lemma A.1 will be used to
study existence of perfect Bayesian equilibria in Theorems 1, 2, and 3. After that, the proof of
Theorem 1 is presented.
Proof of Lemma 1. By Bayes rule, the probabilities (G; B) that a shareholder votes for
the proposal in the good and bad state respectively are given by
G = (1  )!b + !g
B = !b + (1  )!g:
(A1)
The posterior belief that the state is good, ! (T ) ; is given by
! (T ) =
1
1 + (B
G
)T (1 B
1 G )
N T :
Thus, for any strategies !, number of a¢ rmative votes T , and posterior belief ,
! (T ) =  ,
1  

=
TB (1  B)
N T
TG (1  G)
N T :
Taking the logarithm of both sides, rearranging the terms, and isolating T on the left hand side
yields the result, where the function ! () is given by
! () =
N log 1 B
1 G + log

1 
log G
B
+ log 1 B
1 G
: (A2)
From (A2) it follows immediately that ! () is increasing in .
Proof of Lemma 2. The manager observes the outcome of the vote, i.e, the number of
a¢ rmative votes T; and updates his belief to ! (T ) : Given the managers utility function, he
accepts the proposal if and only if
kM! (T )  kM(1  ! (T ))  (1  kM) > 0, ! (T ) >
1
2kM
 :
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Thus, the manager accepts the proposal if and only if T > ! (
). In general, ! (
) is not an
integer, and therefore, the managers threshold strategy is equivalent to rejecting the proposal
for any T 2 f0; 1; ::: b! ()cg and accepting the proposal for any T 2 fb! ()c + 1; :::Ng,
where bxc denotes the highest possible integer that is smaller or equal to x.
LEMMA A.1: Suppose that the manager accepts the proposal if and only if T > T  for some
T  2 [0; N   1] and that N   1 shareholders have a voting strategy ! = (!b; !g) with !g > !b:
Let !;T (s) be the N th shareholders expected benet from voting for the proposal relative to
voting against the proposal given his signal s. Then !;T (g) > !;T (b) and
!;T (g) > 0,
Pr[TN;!=T jB]
Pr[TN;!=T jG] <

1 
1 B
1 G
!;T (b) > 0,
Pr[TN;!=T jB]
Pr[TN;!=T jG] <
1 

1 B
1 G ;
(A3)
where TN;! is the realized number of a¢ rmative votes among N shareholders, assuming that
all of them follow the strategy !.
The proof of Lemma A.1 is relegated to the Internet Appendix.
THEOREM 1: A responsive equilibrium exists if and only if kM > 12 +
1
2
(1 

)2 if N is even,
and if and only if kM > 12 +
1
2
(1 

)
2N
N+1 if N is odd.
Proof of Theorem 1. To prove the theorem, we consider all possible responsive equilibria
characterized by some voting strategy ! = (!b; !g) with !g > !b. For each (!b; !g) ; we nd
conditions under which such equilibrium exists and is responsive using the following argument.
We rst assume that all shareholders follow the voting strategy (!b; !g). Next, we nd the
managers optimal strategy T ! as a best response to the shareholdersstrategy !. We verify
that under the conditions of the theorem, T ! takes values in [0; N   1]; and hence, the outcome
of the vote has the potential to change the managers decision. Finally, we nd conditions under
which the strategy (!b; !g) is indeed optimal for shareholders, i.e., when (!b; !g) is the best
response of each shareholder to the managers strategy T ! and to the remaining shareholders
strategy (!b; !g) :
Suppose that the shareholdersvoting strategy is ! = (!b; !g) with !g > !b: As follows
from the proof of Lemma 2, the manager accepts the proposal if and only if his posterior belief
that the state is good given the vote tally satises ! (T ) > 
 = 1
2kM
; which translates into an
endogenous voting threshold T ! = b! ()c.
Now, consider a shareholders best response strategy to the managers strategy T ! and other
shareholdersstrategy (!b; !g) : Recall from Lemma A.1 that the shareholders expected relative
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benet from voting a¢ rmatively is given by !;T !(s). Thus, if !;T !(s) > 0; the shareholders
best response is to vote a¢ rmatively. If !;T !(s) < 0; the shareholders best response is to vote
against the proposal. Finally, if !;T !(s) = 0; the shareholder is indi¤erent between voting for
and against the proposal and can play a mixed strategy.
According to Lemma A.1, if T ! 2 [0; N  1]; then !;T !(g) > !;T !(b): Hence, if !b 2 (0; 1) ;
then !g = 1; and if !g 2 (0; 1) ; then !b = 0. In other words, if a shareholder with a good
(bad) signal plays a mixed strategy because he is indi¤erent between voting for and against the
proposal, then a shareholder with a bad (good) signal strictly prefers to vote against (for) the
proposal and votes this way with probability 1. It follows that there can only be three types of
responsive equilibria: the equilibrium in pure strategies and these two types of mixed strategy
equilibria. Below, we consider each type of responsive equilibria separately.
1. Pure strategy equilibrium: !b = 0; !g = 1
This equilibrium exists and is responsive if and only if (1) T ! 2 [0; N   1] and (2) !;T !(g) 
0  !;T !(b).
First, note that according to (A1), (G; B) = (; 1  ) when ! = (0; 1). In addition, since
Pr [TN;! = T

! j] = CNT !
T !
 (1  )N T

! , it follows from (A3) that
!;T !(g)  0,
Pr[TN;!=T ! jB]
Pr[TN;!=T ! jG]



1 
2
, T !  N2   1
!;T !(b)  0,
Pr[TN;!=T ! jB]
Pr[TN;!=T ! jG]
 1, T !  N2 :
Note that if T ! 2 [N2  1;
N
2
] (condition (2) above), then the condition T ! 2 [0; N 1] (condition
(1) above) is satised. Thus, a pure strategy responsive equilibrium exists if and only if T ! 2
N
2
  1; N
2

. According to Lemma 2, T ! = b! ()c and ! () is given by (A:2). If N is even,
then T ! =

N
2
+
log 

1 
2 log 
1 

; which lies in

N
2
  1; N
2

if and only if
log 

1 
2 log 
1 
2 ( 1; 1) , 
1  2h
(1 

)2; ( 
1 )
2

. If N is odd, then T ! =

N 1
2
+ 1
2
+
log 

1 
2 log 
1 

which lies in

N
2
  1; N
2

if and
only if 

1  2
h
1 

; 
1 

. We conclude that a pure strategy responsive equilibrium exists if
and only if

1   2
8<:
h
(1 

)2; ( 
1 )
2

if N is evenh
1 

; 
1 

if N is odd.
(A4)
2. Bad type mixing equilibria: !b 2 (0; 1) ; !g = 1
Following similar arguments to those that prove the case of a pure strategy equilibrium, we
show in the Internet Appendix that responsive equilibria with a bad type mixing exist if and
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only if

1   2
8<:
h
1; ( 
1 )
2N
N+2

if N is evenh
1; ( 
1 )
2N
N+1

if N is odd.
(A5)
3. Good type mixing equilibria: !g 2 (0; 1) ; !b = 0
The proof for this type of equilibria is analogous to the proof for bad type mixing equilibria.
We show in the Internet Appendix that responsive equilibria with a good type mixing exist if
and only if

1   2
8<:
h
(1 

)
2N
N+2 ; 1

if N is evenh
(1 

)
2N
N+1 ; 1

if N is odd.
(A6)
Final step - combining the three cases: Combining conditions (A4), (A5), and (A6) for
the three types of responsive equilibria and joining the intervals, we conclude that a responsive
equilibrium exists if and only if

1   2
8<:
h
(1 

)2; ( 
1 )
2

if N is evenh
(1 

)
2N
N+1 ; ( 
1 )
2N
N+1

if N is odd.
(A7)
As follows from the proof, for some values of  in the range (A7), multiple responsive
equilibria exist. Note also that the derivation of (A7) is valid for any threshold belief of the
manager  and does not rely on the fact that in our case  = 1
2kM
.
Finally, since  = 1
2kM
 1
2
for any kM 2 [0; 1] ; then by (A7), a responsive equilibrium
exists if and only if 

1  =
1
2kM 1 is less than (

1 )
2 if N is even, and less than ( 
1 )
2N
N+1 if
N is odd, which is equivalent to the corresponding conditions on kM in the statement of the
theorem.
Proofs for Section II
In order to examine existence of responsive equilibria in the model with an activist investor, we
rst derive the optimal strategies of the manager and the activist. The auxiliary Lemma B.1
derives the optimal strategy of the activist as a function of the vote outcome and the managers
decision. The auxiliary Lemma B.2 derives the optimal strategy of the manager as a function of
the vote outcome, taking into account the activists strategy found in Lemma B.1. After that,
we provide the proofs of Lemma 3, Theorem 2, Theorem 3, and Corollary 1.
LEMMA B.1: Let ! be shareholdersvoting strategies such that !g > !b. There exist posterior
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beliefs A  1   cA=+1
2kA
and R  1 + cA= 1
2kA
; which are independent of !, such that in any
equilibrium if the manager accepts the proposal, then the activist launches a proxy ght if and
only if ! (T ) < 
A, and if the manager rejects the proposal, then the activist launches a proxy
ght if and only if ! (T ) > 
R. Moreover, A < min

R; 1
2
	
.
The proof of Lemma B.1 is relegated to the Internet Appendix.
LEMMA B.2: Let ! be shareholdersvoting strategies such that !g > !b. The manager accepts
the proposal if and only if his posterior beliefs satisfy ! (T ) > 
 given by
  min

max

P ; R
	
; NP
	
; (A8)
where NP  1
2kM
and P  NP   cM
2kM

1  .
The proof of Lemma B.2 is relegated to the Internet Appendix.
Proof of Lemma 3. According to Lemma B.2,  = min

max

P ; R
	
; NP
	
and the
proxy ght is organized whenever the posterior beliefs about the state lie in the interval (R; ]:
Note that NP > 0:5, kM < 1 and R > 0:5, kA >  cA .
First, suppose that the activist is su¢ ciently unbiased: kA >  cA . There are two possible
cases: P  R and P > R: In the rst case,  = minfR; NPg > 0:5 for any kM < 1:
Moreover, because   R; the activist never organizes a proxy ght, letting the manager
reject a value increasing proposal whenever the posterior belief is between 0:5 and  > 0:5.
In the second case,  = P > R > 0:5 and thus, the activist lets the manager reject a value
increasing proposal if the posterior belief is between 0:5 and R > 0:5.
Second, suppose that the activist is biased: kA   cA . There are two possible cases:
P  R and P > R: In the rst case,  = minfR; NPg  R  0:5; so the manager never
rejects a value increasing proposal. In the second case,  = P > R. Hence, the activist
organizes a proxy ght when the posterior belief is between R  0:5 and P ; i.e., the manager
never rejects a value increasing proposal without facing a proxy ght.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof follows the same logic as the proof of Theorem 1. Assuming
by the way of contradiction that some responsive equilibrium (!b; !g) with !g > !b exists, we
nd the best response of the manager characterized by the threshold T ! . Then we show that
under the conditions of the theorem, given strategies (!b; !g) of N   1 shareholders and the
managers strategy T ! , the strategy (!b; !g) cannot be the best response for theN
th shareholder.
In particular, under strategic voting, the shareholder conditions his beliefs on the events when
his vote is pivotal. We demonstrate that if kM  12 +
1
2
(1 

)2, cA > cA, and kA   cA cA ,
the shareholders beliefs in all those events are su¢ ciently optimistic, inducing him to vote
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a¢ rmatively regardless of his signal and thus, contradicting the fact that the strategy !g > !b
must be optimal for him in order for the equilibrium to exist.
We prove the theorem by considering two cases, R  P and R < P , corresponding
to the situations with and without a proxy ght, respectively. We provide below the detailed
proof for case I and relegate the proof for case II to the Internet Appendix.
Case I - R  P . Suppose by the way of contradiction that there exists a responsive
equilibrium (!b; !g) with !g > !b. Since 
R  P , then according to Lemma B.2,  =
min

R; NP
	
2

A; R

and according to Lemma B.1, a proxy ght is not organized in
equilibrium. Thus, the nal outcome is totally determined by the managers action, and the
proposal is accepted if and only if ! (T ) > 
 = min

R; NP
	
.
As was discussed earlier, in the proof of Theorem 1, the expression (A7) was derived for a
general  characterizing the threshold beliefs of the manager. Therefore, we can replicate the
proof of Theorem 1 and conclude that a responsive equilibrium exists if and only if expression
(A7) holds for  = min

R; NP
	
. We next show that (A7) is violated for both R and
NP under the conditions of the theorem. First, the condition kM  12 +
1
2
(1 

)2 is equivalent
to 
NP
1 NP  (

1 )
2 and hence, (A7) is violated for NP  1
2kM
for both even and odd N .
Second, the condition kA   cA cA is equivalent to
R
1 R  (

1 )
2 and hence, (A7) is violated
for R  1 + cA= 1
2kA
for both even and odd N: More specically, the posterior beliefs of the
shareholder conditional on him being pivotal (NP or R) are su¢ ciently high, inducing him to
vote for the proposal even if his private signal is bad. Thus, under the conditions of Theorem
2, a responsive equilibrium does not exist when R  P .
Proof of Theorem 3. For brevity, the theorem is proved only for even N . The case of
odd N follows a very similar set of arguments and hence is omitted. We prove the theorem
considering two possible kinds of responsive equilibria - those where the proxy ght occurs, and
those where the proxy ght does not occur. Recall from Lemmas B.1 and B.2 that if there exists
a responsive equilibrium in which a proxy ght is organized with a strictly positive probability,
then it is necessary that R < P . Hence, if R  P ; then either no responsive equilibrium
exists or there exists a responsive equilibrium in which the proxy ght is never organized.
Case I - R  P . In the Internet Appendix we prove that if R  P ; kM  12 +
1
2
(1 

)2,
and cA 2 (cA; ), then condition (4) is necessary and su¢ cient for existence of a responsive
equilibrium. In such equilibrium a proxy ght is never organized.
Case II - R < P . In the Internet Appendix we prove the following:
II.1 If R < P and kM >

1  cM
cM
 h
1
2
+ 1
2
(1 

)2
i
; then condition (4) is su¢ cient for exis-
tence of a pure strategy responsive equilibrium.
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II.2 If R < P and kM 

1  cM
cM
 h
1
2
+ 1
2
(1 

)2
i
; then condition (5) is su¢ cient for exis-
tence of a responsive equilibrium in which a proxy ght occurs with a positive probability.
Final step - combining cases I and II: The statement of the theorem follows from the
cases considered above. Consider part (i) and suppose that cM  cM . This condition implies
P  0 for any kM . For a responsive equilibrium to exist, it is necessary that R > 0 (and
hence, R > P ) because otherwise, shareholders are never pivotal. According to case I, (4)
is then the necessary condition for existence of a responsive equilibrium. In this equilibrium
the proxy ght is never organized. Conversely, condition (4) implies R > 0, so that R  P
is satised. According to case I, (4) is then a su¢ cient condition for existence of a responsive
equilibrium. This proves part (i) of the theorem.
Next, suppose that cM < cM : Consider part (ii:a) : If 
R  P ; then according to case I,
(4) is su¢ cient for existence of a responsive equilibrium. If R < P ; then according to case
II.1, (4) is again su¢ cient for existence of a responsive equilibrium. Consider part (ii:b). When
kM 

1  cM
cM
 h
1
2
+ 1
2
(1 

)2
i
and (5) is satised, then 
P
1 P  (

1 )
2 > 
1  >
R
1 R and hence,
R < P : Then, according to case II.2, condition (5) is su¢ cient for existence of a responsive
equilibrium, and in this equilibrium a proxy ght occurs with a positive probability.
Proof of Corollary 1. When kM  12 +
1
2
(1 

)2; the activist is unbiased (kA = 1), and
cA 2 (cA; ) ; then according to Theorem 2, a responsive equilibrium does not exist. Since
kM  12 +
1
2
(1 

)2 and since no information is revealed in any non-responsive equilibrium, the
manager rejects the proposal with probability one and hence, shareholder value is always zero.
Suppose instead that kA = 1  cA=. It is easy to show that 1  cA= 2
h
 cA

;  cA

1
2(1 )

h
 cA
 cA
(1 

)2;  cA
 cA

. Hence, according to Theorem 3, a responsive equilibrium always exists
when kA = 1  cA=. Moreover, since R = 1  1 cA=2kA , then 
R = 1
2
. Consider two cases. First,
if P  R; then it follows from the proof of Theorem 3, Case I, that there exists a responsive
equilibrium in which a proxy ght is not organized and  = R = 1
2
. In this equilibrium the
proposal is accepted if and only if the posterior belief that the state is good is greater than
1
2
; which implies that the shareholdersex-post optimal decision rule is implemented. Hence,
expected shareholder value is strictly greater than zero. Second, if P > R; then it follows
from the proof of Theorem 3, Case II, that there exists a responsive equilibrium in which a
proxy ght is organized with a strictly positive probability. In this equilibrium, if the posterior
belief is smaller or equal to R = 1
2
; the proposal is rejected. If the posterior belief is greater
than P > 1
2
; the proposal is accepted. Last, if the posterior belief is greater than 1
2
but smaller
or equal to P ; the proposal is accepted with probability . Either way, the proposal is always
rejected when the posterior belief is below 1
2
and is accepted with a positive probability when
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the posterior belief is above 1
2
. Since some information is revealed in any responsive equilibrium,
the expected value for shareholders is strictly positive. Hence, in any case, shareholder value
under a biased activist with kA = 1   cA= is strictly positive and is strictly greater than
shareholder value under an unbiased activist.
A Proofs for Section III
Proof of Proposition 1. By Lemma B.2,  =  (kA; kM ; cM ; cA; ) ; where  is either
NP = 1
2kM
; or R = 1+ cA 
2kA
; or P = NP   cM
2kM

1  . Since T

! = b! ()c and by Lemma 1,
the function b! ()c is weakly increasing in  and does not depend on any of the parameters
given the voting strategies (!b; !g) = (0; 1), it is su¢ cient to analyze the comparative statics for
. Consider any of the parameters. In the range in which  does not shift between regimes
(NP ; R; or P ) as we change this parameter, the comparative statics follows immediately
from the expressions above. Hence, it remains to prove that the same comparative statics is
true in the range where the shift between regimes occurs. Note that the shift between regimes
is continuous: the change from one type of threshold to another occurs at the point where
the two thresholds are equal. Since each of the thresholds is a continuous function of the
parameter and the type change occurs at the point where these two functions coincide, the
resulting function  is also a continuous function of the parameter. Moreover, if this combined
function is increasing (decreasing) or is constant in the parameter at each of the three segments
(corresponding to three types of threshold), then the combined function is everywhere weakly
increasing (decreasing) in this parameter.
The proof of Proposition 2 is relegated to the Internet Appendix.
Proofs for Section IV
Proof of Lemma 4. Both in the nonbinding mechanism and in the binding mechanism with
threshold T ! ; shareholders understand that the proposal is accepted if and only if the vote tally
exceeds T ! . Hence, if ! are incentive-compatible in the nonbinding mechanism, they are also
incentive compatible in the binding mechanism, and thus constitute an equilibrium.
In order to prove Proposition 3, we rst prove an auxiliary Lemma D.1, which nds the necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for existence of a responsive equilibrium in binding voting under general
prior beliefs.
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LEMMA D.1: Let  be the prior probability that the state is good. A responsive equilibrium in
binding voting with a pure majority rule exists if and only if 
1  2 ((
1 

)
N
2 ; ( 
1 )
N
2
+1):
The proof of Lemma D.1 is relegated to the Internet Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let Tg be the number of good signals among N shareholders. If

1  62 ((
1 

)
N
2 ; ( 
1 )
N
2
+1), then according to lemma D.1, there is no responsive equilibrium in
binding voting. The only possible equilibria are non-responsive ones, in which the probability of
accepting the proposal does not depend on shareholderssignals. Hence, the ex-ante probability
of making a correct decision is 1
2
. Repeating the proof of Theorem 1 for general priors, when N
is even and kM > 12+
1
2
(1 

)2; then for any  there exists a pure strategy responsive equilibrium
in nonbinding voting. In this equilibrium the number of a¢ rmative votes is equal to Tg; and the
manager accepts the proposal if and only if Tg > T  for some threshold T . Then the ex-ante
probability of making the correct decision is Pr(Tg > T jG)12 + Pr(Tg  T
jB)1
2
> Pr(Tg >
T jB)1
2
+ Pr(Tg  T jB)12 =
1
2
, i.e., is strictly greater than under binding voting with a pure
majority rule.
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